

Return-to-libc Attack Lab

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1 Lab Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to gain first-hand experience with a variant of the buffer-overflow attack; this attack can bypass a protection scheme currently implemented in major Linux operating systems. A common way to exploit a buffer-overflow vulnerability is to overflow the buffer with malicious shellcode, and then cause the vulnerable program to jump to the shellcode that is stored in the stack. To prevent these types of attacks, some operating systems provide an ability to make stacks non-executable; therefore, jumping to the shellcode will cause the program to fail.

Unfortunately, the above protection scheme is not fool-proof; there exists a variant of buffer-overflow attack called the `return-to-libc` attack, which does not need an executable stack; it does not even use shell code. Instead, it causes the vulnerable program to jump to some existing code, such as the `system()` function in the `libc` library, which is already loaded into the memory.

In this lab, students are given a program with a buffer-overflow vulnerability; their task is to develop a `return-to-libc` attack to exploit the vulnerability and finally to gain the root privilege. In addition to the attacks, students will be guided to walk through several protection schemes that have been implemented in Ubuntu to counter against the buffer-overflow attacks. Students need to evaluate whether the schemes work or not and explain why.

2 Lab Environment

This lab runs in the Labtainer framework, available at <http://my.nps.edu/web/c3o/labtainers>. That site includes links to a pre-built virtual machine that has Labtainers installed, however Labtainers can be run on any Linux host that supports Docker containers.

From your labtainer-student directory start the lab using:

```
labtainer retlibc
```

Links to this lab manual and to an empty lab report will be displayed. If you create your lab report on a separate system, be sure to copy it back to the specified location on your Linux system.

3 Lab Tasks

You are required to exploit the "retlib" program. You are provided the source code to the program, but you are not to alter the program source code.

3.1 Initial Setup

Address Space Randomization. Ubuntu and several other Linux-based systems uses address space randomization to randomize the starting address of heap and stack. This makes guessing the exact addresses difficult; guessing addresses is one of the critical steps of buffer-overflow attacks. In this lab, we disable this feature using the following command:

```
sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
```

The StackGuard Protection Scheme. The GCC compiler implements a security mechanism called "Stack Guard" to prevent buffer overflows. In the presence of this protection, buffer overflows will fail. You can disable this protection if you compile the program using the `-fno-stack-protector` switch. For example, to compile a program `example.c` with Stack Guard disabled, you may use the following command:

```
$ gcc -m32 -fno-stack-protector example.c
```

The `retlib` program was compiled without StackGuard.

Non-Executable Stack. Ubuntu used to allow executable stacks, but this has now changed: the binary images of programs (and shared libraries) must declare whether they require executable stacks or not, i.e., they need to mark a field in the program header. The kernel or dynamic linker uses this marking to decide whether to make the stack of this running program executable or non-executable. This marking is done automatically by the recent versions of `gcc`, and by default, the stack is set to be non-executable. To change that, use the following option when compiling programs:

For executable stack:

```
$ gcc -m32 -z execstack -o test test.c
```

For non-executable stack:

```
$ gcc -m32 -z noexecstack -o test test.c
```

Because the objective of this lab is to show that the non-executable stack protection does not work, the `retlib` program was compiled with the `"-z noexecstack"` option.

Note for Instructors: For this lab, a lab session is desirable, especially if students are not familiar with the tools and the environments. If an instructor plans to hold a lab session (by himself/herself or by a TA), it is suggested the following to be covered in the lab session ¹:

1. The use of Labtainers.
2. Basic use of `gdb` debug commands and stack structure.

Review the `retlib.c` program. It has a buffer overflow vulnerability. It first reads an input of size 80 bytes from a file called "badfile" into a buffer that is smaller than 80 bytes, causing the overflow. The function `fread()` does not check boundaries, so a buffer overflow will occur. Since this program is a set-root-uid program, if a normal user can exploit this buffer overflow vulnerability, the normal user might be able to get a root shell. It should be noted that the program gets its input from a file called "badfile". This file is under the users' control. Our objective is to create the contents for "badfile", such that when the vulnerable program copies the contents into its buffer, a root shell can be spawned.

¹We assume that the instructor has already covered the concepts of the attacks in the lecture, so we do not include them in the lab session.

3.2 Task 1: Exploiting the Vulnerability

Create the **badfile**. Your home directory includes an "exploit.c" program that you can modify in order to create the badfile.

You need to figure out the values for the addresses in that program, as well as where to store those addresses. If you incorrectly calculate the locations, your attack might not work.

After you modify the exploit.c program, compile using `compile_exploit.sh` and run it; this will generate the contents for "badfile". Run the vulnerable program `retlib`. If your exploit is implemented correctly, when the function `bof` returns, it will return to the `system()` libc function, and execute `system("/bin/sh")`. If the vulnerable program is running with the root privilege, you can get the root shell at this point.

It should be noted that the `exit()` function is not very necessary for this attack; however, without this function, when `system()` returns, the program might crash, causing suspicions.

```
$ ./compile_exploit.sh
$ ./exploit          // create the badfile
$ ./retlib          // launch the attack by running the vulnerable program
# <---- You've got a root shell!
```

Questions. In your report, please answer the following questions:

- Please describe how you decide the values for X, Y and Z. Either show us your reasoning, or if you use trial-and-error approach, show your trials.
- After your attack is successful, change the file name of `retlib` to a different name, making sure that the length of the file names are different. For example, you can change it to `newretlib`. Repeat the attack (without changing the content of `badfile`). Is your attack successful or not? If it does not succeed, explain why.

3.3 Task 2: Address Randomization

In this task, let us turn on the Ubuntu's address randomization protection. We run the same attack developed in Task 1. Can you get a shell? If not, what is the problem? How does the address randomization make your return-to-libc attack difficult? You should describe your observation and explanation in your lab report. You can use the following instructions to turn on the address randomization:

```
sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2
```

3.4 Task 3: Stack Guard Protection

In this task, let us turn on the Ubuntu's Stack Guard protection. Please remember to turn off the address randomization protection. We run the same attack developed in Task 1. Can you get a shell? If not, what is the problem? How does the Stack Guard protection make your return-to-libc attack difficult? You should describe your observation and explanation in your lab report. You can use the following instructions to compile your program with the Stack Guard protection turned on.

```
sudo su
# gcc -m32 -z noexecstack -o retlib retlib.c
# chmod 4755 retlib
# exit
```

4 Guidelines: Understanding the function call mechanism

4.1 Find out the addresses of libc functions

To find out the address of any libc function, you can use the following `gdb` commands (`a.out` is an arbitrary program):

```
$ gdb a.out

(gdb) b main
(gdb) r
(gdb) p system
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0x9b4550 <system>
(gdb) p exit
$2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0x9a9b70 <exit>
```

From the above `gdb` commands, we can find out that the address for the `system()` function is `0x9b4550`, and the address for the `exit()` function is `0x9a9b70`. The actual addresses in your system might be different from these numbers.

4.2 Putting the shell string in the memory

One of the challenge in this lab is to put the string `"/bin/sh"` into the memory, and get its address. This can be achieved using environment variables. When a C program is executed, it inherits all the environment variables from the shell that executes it. The environment variable `SHELL` points directly to `/bin/bash` and is needed by other programs, so we introduce a new shell variable `MYSHELL` and make it point to `zsh`

```
$ export MY_SHELL=/bin/sh
```

We will use the address of this variable as an argument to `system()` call. The location of this variable in the memory can be found out easily using the following program:

```
void main(){
    char* shell = getenv("MYSHELL");
    if (shell)
        printf("%x\n", (unsigned int)shell);
}
```

If the address randomization is turned off, you will find out that the same address is printed out. However, when you run the vulnerable program `retlib`, the address of the environment variable might not be exactly the same as the one that you get by running the above program; such an address can even change when you change the name of your program (the number of characters in the file name makes difference). The good news is, the address of the shell will be quite close to what you print out using the above program. Therefore, you might need to try a few times to succeed.

4.3 Understand the Stack

To know how to conduct the `return-to-libc` attack, it is essential to understand how the stack works. We use a small C program to understand the effects of a function invocation on the stack.

```
/* foobar.c */
#include<stdio.h>
void foo(int x)
{
    printf("Hello world: %d\n", x);
}

int main()
{
    foo(1);
    return 0;
}
```


We can use "gcc -m32 -S foobar.c" to compile this program to the assembly code. The resulting file foobar.s will look like the following:

```
.....
 8 foo:
 9     pushl   %ebp
10     movl    %esp, %ebp
11     subl   $8, %esp
12     movl   8(%ebp), %eax
13     movl   %eax, 4(%esp)
14     movl   $.LC0, (%esp) : string "Hello world: %d\n"
15     call   printf
16     leave
17     ret

.....
21 main:
22     leal   4(%esp), %ecx
23     andl   $-16, %esp
24     pushl  -4(%ecx)
25     pushl  %ebp
26     movl   %esp, %ebp
27     pushl  %ecx
28     subl   $4, %esp
29     movl   $1, (%esp)
30     call   foo
31     movl   $0, %eax
32     addl   $4, %esp
33     popl   %ecx
34     popl   %ebp
35     leal  -4(%ecx), %esp
36     ret
```

4.4 Calling and Entering foo()

Let us concentrate on the stack while calling foo(). We can ignore the stack before that. Please note that line numbers instead of instruction addresses are used in this explanation.

Figure 1: Entering and Leaving `foo()`

- **Line 28-29:** These two statements push the value 1, i.e. the argument to the `foo()`, into the stack. This operation increments `%esp` by four. The stack after these two statements is depicted in Figure ??(a).
- **Line 30: `call foo`:** The statement pushes the address of the next instruction that immediately follows the `call` statement into the stack (i.e the return address), and then jumps to the code of `foo()`. The current stack is depicted in Figure ??(b).
- **Line 9-10:** The first line of the function `foo()` pushes `%ebp` into the stack, to save the previous frame pointer. The second line lets `%ebp` point to the current frame. The current stack is depicted in Figure ??(c).
- **Line 11: `subl $8, %esp`:** The stack pointer is modified to allocate space (8 bytes) for local variables and the two arguments passed to `printf`. Since there is no local variable in function `foo`, the 8 bytes are for arguments only. See Figure ??(d).

4.5 Leaving `foo()`

Now the control has passed to the function `foo()`. Let us see what happens to the stack when the function returns.

- **Line 16: `leave`:** This instruction implicitly performs two instructions (it was a macro in earlier x86 releases, but was made into an instruction later):

```
mov  %ebp, %esp
pop  %ebp
```

The first statement release the stack space allocated for the function; the second statement recover the previous frame pointer. The current stack is depicted in Figure ??(e).

- **Line 17: `ret`:** This instruction simply pops the return address out of the stack, and then jump to the return address. The current stack is depicted in Figure ??(f).
- **Line 32: `addl $4, %esp`:** Further restore the stack by releasing more memories allocated for `foo`. As you can clearly see that the stack is now in exactly the same state as it was before entering the function `foo` (i.e., before line 28).

References

- [1] c0ntext Bypassing non-executable-stack during exploitation using return-to-libc http://www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources/pdf/return-to-libc.pdf
- [2] Phrack by Nergal Advanced return-to-libc exploit(s) *Phrack 49*, Volume 0xb, Issue 0x3a. Available at <http://www.phrack.org/archives/58/p58-0x04>